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L-Makhzan al-’Akbari: Resistance, Remembrance and 
Remediation in Morocco
Miriyam Aouragh (CAMRI, London)
Abstract: Morocco was prompted by the sense of making and witnessing history that began as 
the backdrop to the mass uprisings across the region in 2011 and continued well into 2012. At 
several moments the country at large burst into a mosaic of rebellion. As expected, the state 
intervened with media propaganda, smear campaigns and intimidation to pre-empt the growing 
impact of the activists and as such to erase this revolutionary episode effectively from Morocco’s 
collective memory. This article examines the practices and implications of the remediation of past 
experiences of struggles and brings the memories of past resistance together with experiences of 
present struggles. This article takes particular interest in the intersection between 20Feb 
activists’political projects and the growing array of digital politics and allows us to understand better 
the impact of digital media in times of revolution.
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In the spring of 2011 Morocco burst into a mosaic of rebellion. The exhilarating sense of 
both making and witnessing history continued into 2012. The authorities were taken by 
surprise. The state intervened with media propaganda; smear campaigns and intimidation 
so as to weaken the upsurge of mass protest. Its main objective was to pre-empt the grow- 
ing impact of the activists and as such to erase this revolutionary episode effectively from 
Morocco’s collective memory, as it has done with all previous uprisings. These dynamics 
suggest that political struggles in the present already and inevitably engage with a future. 
Protest repertoires expressed through slogans like ‘‘ash al-Sh’ab’ [Long Live the People, 
as opposed to the common ‘Long Live the King’] and new demands for karama or ‘adala 
(dignity or justice) were contentious, since people interpreted them as actually possible: it 
was a revolt worth rebelling for.
The central aim of this article is to examine the practices and implications of the reme- 
diation of past experiences of struggles, or rather how the memories thereof continue, shift 
and morph with present struggles. This analysis is grounded empirically in fieldwork I 
undertook in (north) Morocco between 2013 and 2016, during which I conducted interviews 
with activists from the network that derived its name, the 20 February movement, from the 
first national protest in February 2011, known variously as al-Haraka, 20Fev and 20Feb 
(hereafter, 20Feb). Some of the participants never before had engaged in political activity 
while others had done so in the past. This article attempts to bring aspects concerning 
memories of past resistance and experiences of present struggles together and to link them 
to an understanding of digital media in times of revolution. While this article is not a 
reflection on the theories and practices of 20Feb as a movement or event in general, it 
recalls that 20Feb was an amalgamation of political groups and individuals, of existing 
and ad hoc organizations, and the sum of the different ideological strands and groups 
affiliated with the labour movement, human rights groups, environmental groups and 
Amazigh rights groups. The network was a unique united front among Islamists, 
reformists and the revolutionary left. Thousands of Moroccans who either never had 
protested before or protested in their particular geographic settings for social-economic 
rights1 joined forces with organizations offering crucial experience that predated the 20Feb 
momentum, such as the national student union (Union Nationale des Étudiants du Maroc, 
or UNEM), the human rights association (Association Marocaine des Droits Humains, or 
AMDH), the anticapitalist group ATTAC and progressive labour unions.2 20Feb also 
provided a new opportunity for minoritarian Amazigh activists to push forward their long-
standing demands.3 The movement was explic- itly inclusive, with banners in both Arabic 
and the Berber script tifinagh.
20Feb has been through several alterations since its inception. A dramatic change in 
composition was the retreat of the mass-based officially still banned al-’adl wa-l-Ihsan 
(Justice and Charity) movement in the first year. Still, the very fact that the possibility of 
improvements mobilized hundreds of thousands of people across the country despite the high 
costs of taking a public stance against the makhzan—the dynastic nation with a deep-state 
administration in Morocco—signifies a crisis of the dominant system. Morocco commonly 
is described as the positive ‘exception,’ and it indeed stood out from other Arab uprisings in 
that the state successfully managed to deflect attention and sow confusion among activists. 
The highly mediatized King’s Speech on March 8, 2011, and the fact that the leader of the 
Islamist PJD (Justice and Development) party, Abdelilah Benkirane, was invited to form 
a new government in November 2011 out-foxed the broad grassroots dynamic because 
these interventions contributed to the retreat of several organizations that wanted to give 
the promised improvements a chance.4 The 20Feb movement morphed into new coalitions 
around issues at the local level. Many activists continue to identify with 20Feb and often 
recall that period between 2011 and 2012 through commemorative events.
This article takes particular interest in the intersection between 20Feb activists’ political 
projects and the growing array of digital memories, and while it focuses on political change, 
it gravitates toward Morocco’s grassroots activism, a perspective that often is overlooked 
in the mostly liberal mainstream publications about the ‘Arab Spring’ or Moroccan poli- 
tics. In due course, this double approach adds to the understanding of the power and poli- 
tics of memory-making and contributes to the kind of analyses Andreas Bandak and Sune 
Haugbolle in this issue describe as an ‘open-ended situation lingering between hope and
1 K. Bogaert (2015) The Revolt of Small Towns: The Meaning of Morocco’s History and Geography of Social 
Protests, Review of African Political Economy, 42(143), pp. 124–140.
2 M. Buehler (2015) Labor Demands, Regime Concessions: Moroccan Unions and the Arab Uprisings, British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 42(1), pp. 88–103; S. Cohen (2014) Neoliberalism and Academia in Morocco, 
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 41(1), pp. 28–42; and F. Kohstall (2015) From Reform to Resistance: 
Universities and Student Mobilisation in Egypt and Morocco before and after the Arab Uprisings, British Journal 
of Middle Eastern Studies, 42(1), pp. 59–73.
3 P. Silverstein & D. Crawford (2004) Amazigh Activism and the Moroccan State, Middle East Report, 233/34(4), 
pp. 44–48; D. Rossi-Doria (2016) ‘Le Printemps Démocratique’: Amazigh Activism in the February 20 
Movement in Southern Morocco, Contemporary Levant, 1(1), pp. 64–75.
4 A. Benchemsi (2012) Morocco: Outfoxing the Opposition, Journal of Democracy, 23(1), pp. 57–69.
despair, action and inaction, exhaustion and revolutionary belief.’5 This historical ‘moment,’ 
marked by repression and resistance, is ongoing and fluid. Therefore, in order to discuss the 
unique dynamics and peoples’ attempts to be heard, we will need theories that emerge from 
collective efforts and at different times—from struggles that connect ‘the bygone times, the 
current time and the forthcoming time.’6 Whereas the online memories I will discuss later 
exist in the technological realm, many of the local experiences they refer to concern offline 
manifestations of radical politics. This dual reality between past and present and between 
online and offline resilience runs throughout this article. Memories are produced and main- 
tained first and foremost through material infrastructures and power relations, the article 
therefore begins with an exploration of the political-economic context of social media and 
mediation in Morocco.
Morocco’s Media (r)Evolution
Soon after Morocco’s formal independence from France (1956), the then present media 
became national state media, and it didn’t take long before all of the independent political, 
cultural and academic outlets were repressed. After a brief period, the new state grew increas- 
ingly oppressive during much of King Hassan II’s reign (1961–1998). The brutal suppres- 
sion of the Rif uprising in 1958–59 deeply shocked the country, especially the population 
in the north, yet the repression of journalists and intellectuals meant that the Rif uprising 
and its defeat was successfully sealed off from the media and educational sources (and thus 
in national popular consciousness) and the Rif rebels certainly were not commemorated. 
The Moroccan leadership legitimized the repression as a necessary response to unpatriotic 
insurrections. The overall crackdown peaked after the two failed coups against the king in 
the early 1970s and the appropriation of Western Sahara in 1975, all of which provided the 
conditions for an all-out blackout of the media. It soon became a static, compulsive segment 
of the public and political sphere.7
The media landscape opened up when commercial players disrupted the monopolist 
infrastructure in the late 1990s. But rather than outcomes of the free market ‘trickledown’ 
promises, these changes were more related to the political shake-ups. Mohamed VI needed 
to prepare a new personality for when he would take over the throne from his father Hassan 
II, who was already gravely ill in the late 1990s. This involved the makhzen’s co-optation of 
some of its adversaries in the unions, political parties and civil society. The makhzan invited 
the banned Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP) to join legislative elections and 
allowed Abdelrahman Youssfi, leader of the USFP, to form the new parliament. The debates 
about family law, human rights and free press symbolized landmark changes and the stagnant 
top-down economy made way for ‘creative’ business models. The transformation to neo- 
liberal capitalism, which initially began in the 1970s through IMF interventions, happened 
extremely fast and by the 1990s capital was channelled through multinational networks 
that mushroomed as part of the great incentives offered by economic liberalization in the 
background of the preparations for the ascendance of Mohammed VI.
5 See S. Haugbolle & A. Bandak (2017) The Ends of Revolution: Rethinking Ideology and Time in the Arab 
Uprisings, the introductory article for this issue.
6 A. Hajek, C. Lohmeier & C. Pentzold (2016) Memory in a Mediated World: Remembrance and Reconstruction
(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 2.
7 F. Loudiya & A. R. Smith (2005) Testing the Red Lines: On the Liberalization of Speech in Morocco, Human 
Rights Quarterly, 27(3), pp. 1069–1119; and J. Smolin (2013) Moroccan Noir: Police, Crime, and Politics in 
Popular Culture (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press).
Contextualization beyond the too commonly associated issue of political repression is 
required to understand these changes, and one focus for the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) that is different from Islamism or authoritarianism can be found in shifting capital 
accumulation and class structures.8 As recent scholarship demonstrates, MENA class and 
state formations are directly linked to the international accumulation of capital.9 The fact 
that Morocco’s increasing GDP goes in tandem with increasing inequality exemplifies the 
capitalist contradiction that wealth can maintain or increase poverty. This (supposed) paradox 
occurs in many post-colonial states where neoliberal capitalism was set up in the space of a 
few decades, as opposed to being part of a development that took more than two centuries 
in Europe.10 The point is that authoritarian regimes are not necessarily opposed to neolib- 
eral capitalism but are rather a functional outcome of that mode of economic development. 
In Morocco itself the synchronization of financial and royal power grew even deeper. The 
tight relations between the kings’ court and crony interlocutors in financial networks testify 
to this.11 David Crawford describes the emergence of a Moroccan lumpenproletariat in an 
outstanding 2008 ethnography of the High Atlas region.12 The bitter truth is that young, 
well-educated Moroccans are living a more precarious life than their parents.13 The mass 
protests in Tunisia showed this clearest, and the so-called ‘Bouazizi Syndrome’ became a 
thorn for all regimes.
A different but interrelated ambiguity can be found in the Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) and media sector, which also gave rise to a new generation of media 
entrepreneurs that overlapped with new approaches to (non-state) mass media develop- 
ment during the reform phase that began in the late 1990s. Journalists, emboldened by the 
changes, were pushing the boundaries and experimenting. While media policies changed, 
the infrastructure itself was undergoing further leaps with the emergence of the internet in 
the early 2000s. New online and print outlets were tapping into new, younger audiences 
that had been socialized in the breathing space during the transition period from Hassan II 
to Mohamed VI. During that small window of opportunity, journalists such as Ali Alnouzla, 
Ali Lmrabet, Ahmed Benchemsi and Aboubakr Jamaï wrote daringly anti-regime journalism, 
and founded ground-breaking magazines such as Hespress, Lakome, TelQuel and Nishan. 
The emergence of social media platforms, and the impact of digitization on journalists’ 
activity, led to a more dynamic and networked public sphere.
But the context was also shaped by a political-economy that encouraged an intimate 
relationship between oligopolies and media organizations, which encompasses personal and 
institutional relations, from power in the judiciary system to micro-level private relations 
between press owners and managers, the system of patronage and favouritism known as
8 It is in this case interesting to consider Tangier, where my fieldwork largely took place, as a key source of cheap 
labor in the international division of labor, providing for western companies from which local elites generously 
scrape the monetary residues.
9 A. Hanieh (2013) Lineages of Revolt: Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East (Chicago, IL: 
Haymarket Books).
10 G. Achcar (2013) The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press).
11 M. Oubenal (2016) Crony Interlockers and the Centrality of Banks: The Network of Moroccan Listed Companies. 
ERF working paper.
12  D. Crawford (2008) Moroccan Households in the World Economy: Labor and Inequality in a Berber Village
(Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press).
13 S. Cohen & J. Larabi (2006) Morocco: Globalization and its Consequences (New York: Routledge Press).
Figure 1. Mobilization video by 20Feb disseminated via YouTube, Facebook and Twitter.
ma’rifa in Morocco. For instance, most private radio stations in contemporary Morocco 
are owned by business corporations.14 We are reminded that ‘modern’ infrastructures and 
hyper-capitalist liberalization are not in contradiction with oppressive policies or dictato- 
rial models, as seen also with commercial media in Syria.15 By 2011, many realized that 
reactionary rule associated with the Hassan II era actually had been conserved all along. 
Critique around issues that were taboo in the mainstream media proved to be particularly 
risky when it also overlaps with sensitive issues.16 The past five years in Morocco show 
that when public outrage synchronizes with political mobilization via smart instrumental- 
ization of digital media (see Figure 1), dissidence travels between local, national and even 
global stages. During such intersections the country can be swept by protest, sometimes 
the government faces international pressure. This particular synchronization helps explain 
why Morocco experienced a clamping down on internet freedom, the implementation of a 
series of restrictive laws, and increasing online surveillance.
The state did not implement the most visible and some of the more draconian measures 
seen in other Arab regimes in response to the uprisings. It realized it had to be extra careful 
in the way it managed discontent and did so with its well-known double-faced character.
14 D. Ksikes, A. Benchenna, & D. Marchetti (2017) (forthcoming) Media in Morocco: When Economics are a 
Very Political Issue, Everything else is Fine, Journal of North African Studies.
15 D. Della Ratta (2012) Dramas of the Authoritarian State. Merip Online. Available at http://www.merip.org/mero/ 
interventions/dramasauthoritarianstate?ip_login_no_cache=49e62796f80baab87526251c83632bef, accessed 
November 2016.
16 For instance, the Amina Filali, Daniel Gate, Ali Anouzla, and most recently the Mohsin Fikri cases. These 
occasions, respectively, concerned a raped teenager being told to marry her assailant, a well-known Spanish 
pedophile being released from prison and the country by the king, a journalist being arrested and his journal 
closed after reporting on the latter case, and a fish vendor being crushed to death in a garbage truck.
This resonates with Jonathan Smolin’s observation in Moroccan Noir, where he graphically 
illustrates the makhzan’s unswerving attempt to improve public opinion about the regime 
via police forces. We discover how popular media embraces and fuses anxieties about crime 
and juxtaposes them with a reform agenda, which actually helps to improve the reputation 
of the notorious security apparatus.17 Smolin’s examples show that, in the long run, report- 
ing on violent and extremely corrupt perpetrators produced a new kind of fear, the fear of 
criminals and terrorists. These are the dehumanized and the depoliticized Others from whom 
ordinary Moroccans need to be protected, and against which the makhzan retakes the moral 
high ground and demands increasingly harsh policies (e.g., counter-terrorism laws). This 
tactic turned out to be an important pre-emptive move in 2011.
Following the state news channels (M1 and 2 M) during fieldwork between 2011 and 
2015, I noticed an adaption. The agenda shifting from attention to the domestic (suggesting 
there is not much to gain) to the regional (implying how much there is to lose). For example, 
the official media disproportionately mediates news concerning Syria, especially after late 
2011, when events there span out of control. Although the Moroccan state media cynically 
capitalized on the miseries of Syrians, it hardly offered any reflection on, for instance, the 
important (and still hopeful) process in Tunisia. This is a conscious choice by the state, and a 
dangerous one, since it produces a discursive and visual framework for sectarian tensions in 
Morocco, hence the comment from a bystander with whom I spoke during a waqfa’ (sit-in) 
in December 2013 in Tangier ‘But we don’t want civil war like in Syria, did you see the 
news, you want the Riyafa to kill the Arabs or Souassa to kill the Jbala?’18
Morocco illustrates what is common across the world: That political communication is 
an essential tool for capitalist hegemony, to paraphrase Antonio Gramsci.19 As found across 
the world, the juxtaposition of a dominant corporate media sector and state power is obvious 
through the tight networks of shareholders, politicians and media moguls. Moreover, the 
way that repression is reframed as part of a democratic agenda, rather than its negation, is 
very familiar to Moroccan activists. Both the Patriot Act in the United States and the ‘anti- 
radicalization’ Prevent program recently enacted in the UK sacrifice liberties in the name 
of security. The 2003 Casablanca bombings allowed the makhzan to redefine its repressive 
measures as counter-terrorism. This relationship is also present in the mistreatment of 20Feb 
activists through censorship and surveillance.20 Moreover, there is another, more sacred, 
feature that allows state hegemony in Morocco to reach beyond its abilities.
The Moroccan regime derives religious legitimacy from the Mohamed VI’s sharifiyan lin- 
eage—his alleged family relationship to Prophet Mohamed, Ali and Fatima—and the king’s 
position as Amir al-Mu’mineen (Commander of the Faithful). This is a tremendous benefit, 
a grotesque ‘social capital’ so to say, that partly explains why powerful contenders such as 
the grassroots al-’adl wa-l-Ihsan movement, or the parliamentary contender hizb al-’adala 
wa-l-Tilmiya (The Party of Justice and Development or PJD) have difficulty breaking this
17 J. Smolin (2013) Moroccan Noir: Police, Crime, and Politics in Popular Culture (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press). But while this is allowed (e.g., access to crime scenes and photos and personal details) since 
it overlaps with the wish to project a new-born, clean and accountable government since the 1990s, it is also 
the hard work and demand of numerous independent journalists and outlets.
18 These terms refer to different socio-linguistic groups in the North, East, Middle and South of Morocco.
19 A. Gramsci (1971) The Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers).
20 The case of Mamfakinch and other anti-regime media is notable. See: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/ 
research/2016/12/how-a-hacking-campaign-helped-shut-down-an-award-winning-news-site/.
hegemony.21 The main explanation of state hegemony is that the makhzan has excelled in 
co-opting elements of the opposition ever since independence. To the backdrop of protests 
in 2011, the makhzan allowed the PJD to participate in the legislative elections. With that 
move, it managed to kill two birds with one stone, bringing to mind the incorporation of the 
USFP in the 1997 elections. During those elections, the overwhelming boycott among the 
left in protest of the proposed artificial reforms led to a split in the vote. Not long after the 
PJD announced it would join the elections in the fall of 2011, the popular al-’adl wa-l-Ihsan 
turned its back on 20Feb. The PJD had brought with them logistical and financial resources, 
as well as many of its members who were a substantial part of the movement as a whole and 
contributed a large part of the infrastructure. For most activists I interviewed, the sudden 
retreat was felt as a betrayal, especially when violent crackdowns began to be applied, and 
the number of people on the street, forming massive defence lines, really mattered. Morocco 
shows that despite its sacred appeal the monopoly of violence is a crucial role for maintaining 
political hegemony. One of the promising contradictions of capitalist development is that 
the public, i.e., working-classes that produce and consume communication products—use 
these technological tools in ways not intended for them.
The Internet: Game Changer or Change Maker?
Since 1990 the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have become a comfort-zone 
for capitalist accumulation, including for the ICT sector. However, as mentioned above 
increased levels of ICT production and dissemination have not reduced ideological (content) 
or material (access) bias.22 Inequality inherently is built into the socio-economic structures 
of contemporary capitalism,23 and the privileged capitalist class, not the immediate produc- 
ers, own profit derived from the surplus-value.24 Free-market liberalism amidst political 
transformations in Morocco did not lead to horizontal networks of participation. One of the 
sharpest illustrations since 2011 has been the systematic targeting of political critics and 
the media outlets they speak through, which increasingly are forced to outmanoeuvre state 
media, avoid surveillance and find alternatives to inaccessible infrastructures.
The most deceptive craft that combines coercion and consent is the road through bureau- 
cracy and red-tape via incomprehensible regulations, and of course extravagant fines.25 The 
war on terror and especially the Arab uprisings eventually gave online surveillance further 
leverage.26 The reason this works so well is that the makhzan retains full access to judicial 
and administrative mechanisms, such as direct control of the official press agency Maghreb 
Arab Press (MAP). The independent regulating body Haute Autorité de la Communication
21 A. Boukhars (2011) Politics in Morocco: Executive Monarchy and Enlightened Authoritarianism (New York: 
Routledge); I. F. Molina (2011) The Monarchy vs. the February 20 Movement: Who Holds the Reins of Political 
Change in Morocco?, Mediterranean Politics, 16(3), pp. 435–441; and M. Daadaoui (2011) Moroccan Monarchy 
and the Islamist Challenge: Maintaining the Makhzen Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
22 M. Aouragh & P. Chakravartty (2016) Infrastructures of Empire: Towards a Critical Geopolitics of Media and 
Information Studies, Media, Culture and Society, 38(4), pp. 559–575.
23 J. Dean (2005) Communicative Capitalism: Circulation and the Foreclosure of Politics, Cultural Politics, An 
International Journal 1(1):51–74.
24 C. Fuchs (2015) Against Theoretical Thatcherism: A Reply to Nicholas Garnham, Media Culture & Society, 
38(2).
25 B. Zaid & I. Mohamed (2011) Mapping Digital Media: Morocco. A Report by the Open Society Foundations.Available 
at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/mapping-digital-media-morocco-20130805.pdf, 
accessed November 2016.
26 H. Elmiraat (2015) Their Eyes On Me: Stories of Surveillance in Morocco (London: Privacy International) 
Available at: https://privacyinternational.org/node/554, accessed November 2016.
Audiovisuelle (HAC) was established in 2002 by royal decree in order to grant TV licenses 
and accredit radio frequencies. But despite the official independence of the HAC, the 
makhzan remains the de facto regulator. Interestingly, the Moroccan state proclaims its 
conformity to international media standards, while defending Moroccan exceptionalism in 
its press codes in quite inconsistent ways.27
Ordinary, working-class people, whether organized politically or not, produce a lot of 
dissident media and have contributed during politically contentious moments mostly through 
their increased use of social media.28 The 2008 protest in the port town of Sidi Ifni follow- 
ing a labour strike demonstrates the radical political potential of mobile phone cameras 
and YouTube.29 Some of the first public outcries over events filmed on mobile phones and 
disseminated via video sites were of police violence. Whereas the violation of Sidi Ifni 
remained confined to the margins of social media platforms, recordings of police officers 
accepting or demanding bribes caused a wider stir. In some cases the uploaded videos led 
to parliamentary outcries and announcements of policy changes. Especially when internet 
consumption normalized, including the ways that political events were consumed, available 
technologies began to change the objective conditions, the rules of the game, so to speak.30 
Although technologies have no independent agency, they altered the algorithms of protest, 
changing the game between the makhzan and the activists. What is more, the protests in 
2011 represented a unique historical convergence of a new generation of activists and a 
new media ecology. Furthermore, political content that is disseminated online inevitably is 
archived. Retrospective access to the legacies of the ‘Ayaam Rassas’ (‘the years of lead’; 
the most repressive period of Hassan II’s rule) became meaningful in the last decade of 
expanding internet access, but the meaning of these memories also changed during the new 
(revolutionary) moment.
The question often is asked whether the internet became a game-changer, but more inter- 
esting than determining the power of the internet is to acknowledge that new digital infra- 
structures changed the dissemination of content. Yet, even though public discourse about 
the role of the internet tended to frame it as such, it was mostly not on their own terms: It is 
not ‘their’ media. Digital media offers important additional agency to activists and obvious 
vernacular features that favour revolutionary narratives. But what if this self-expression has 
revolutionary potential? Digital tools can help decode past experiences (see next section), as 
for instance in the way that revolutionary artefacts—images of anti-colonial icon Abdelkrim 
al-Khattabi, or songs about the famous prisoner Saida Menebhi—are made and remade 
via the internet. This corresponds directly with the notion ‘mediated world,’ a conceptual 
space where media and memory come together and re-create a sense of past and present and 
future.31 Activist digital media help document, mediate and archive the activities, some of 
whose objects are appropriated and in turn produce new initiatives. In revolutionary times, 
this occurs mostly during collective struggle.
27 Ksikes, Benchenna & Marchetti (2017, forthcoming) Media in Morocco: When Economics are a very political 
issue, Everything else is fine, in Journal of North African Studies.
28 M. Aouragh & A. Alexander (2011) The Egyptian Experience: Sense and Nonsense of the Internet Revolution, 
International Journal of Communication, 5, pp. 1344–1358, 1932–8036; and A. Alexander and M. Aouragh 
(2014) Egypt’s Unfinished Revolution: The Role of the Media Revisited, International Journal of Communication, 
8, pp. 890–915.
29 See: http://observers.france24.com/en/20080821-amateur-video-beating-sidi-ifni-morocco, accessed November 
2016.
30 HCP (2014) The overall internet penetration rate has reached 70%, and social networking sites such as Facebook 
is at least 30%.
31 J. van Dijck (2007) Mediated Memories in the Digital Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).
The particular socio-techno synchronization between mass access to the internet and 
social movement activism during politically contentious moments occurs in two related 
ways. First, new formats bring new mnemonic devices into action, affecting how activists 
disseminate their victories and defeats. Second, activists acquire instant access to events and 
also tap into different temporalities at once. Against analyses that exaggerate the novelty of 
new movements or unique tools, it became clear to me during fieldwork that non-novelty 
was not a weakness but actually a potential strength, produced by long-term experiences in 
the ambiguous realities of local (illicit) politics, warranted accountability or personal trust 
grown over the years. Many activists rejected the almost obsessive focus on ‘new’ ways to 
frame their struggle. In our conversations, they often complained that political economy, 
ideology and material rights are hardly part of that discourse, that the celebration of ‘new 
media’ was patronizing, and even pathologized their project. The neophile framing of these 
protest movements is itself an attempt to remove ideology from the revolutionary project.32 
Revolutionary moments therefore have a double effect in the landscape of social media: the 
moment itself, and the later reliving of that moment because it is always filmed, stored and 
becomes accessible, which has a number of consequences.
The Moroccan regime understands that history cuts like a knife and some political memo- 
ries risk undermining it. The political past is disturbing. The rediscoveries of activists when 
looking into web archives and newly accessible content, especially amid confrontations in 
2011 that were eerily similar to repression in earlier generations, helped open a memorial 
lid. I am referring to a lid that stayed closed even when there were numerous reconciliation 
efforts and public confession witness trials about the brutal period between 1961 and 1999. 
Thus, a politics of memory appeared (see next section) that differed from state-initiated rec- 
onciliation and archiving projects concerning the ‘years of lead.’ Although long overdue, it 
was in principle welcomed by diverse sections of the movement because there were promises 
of accountability.33 But the extraordinary elements (specifically the chilling testimonies) 
notwithstanding, by touching it the makhzan cast a spell on the reconciliation project. It’s the 
makhzen’s own direct responsibility for perpetrating abuses (disappearances, torture, decades 
of incarceration) that is still fresh in popular memory. But the regime simply had avoided 
confronting the past because the conditions under which it allowed the tribunals to review 
the complaints—forbidding naming and prosecuting perpetrators—were severely limiting. 
True reconciliation without accountability is impossible: All the conditions, exceptions, 
disclaimers emptied it of real potential and washed away much of the emotional efforts and 
hopes attached to it.
This is why several interviewees spoke of a revolutionary shake-off, one that clears the 
old stupefying (and deliberately anti-intellectual) smoke screens. They were, for instance, 
challenging dominant narratives about human capacities for change and progress during 
public discussions, such as the ‘Felsafa fe Zenqa’ (‘philosophy on the street’) initiated by 
recently politicized youths. They deliberately organized in parks and streets to break the fear 
and normalize the idea of coming together and discussing socio-political matters. At one of 
the gatherings I attended, the participants mentioned that Morocco needs two revolutions, 
‘thawra ‘iqliya’ (‘of the mind’) and thawra siyasiya (‘political’). Some of them exchanged 
Marxist books that were printed in the 1970s and 1980s (Figure 2).
32  A. Alexander & M. Aouragh (2014) Egypt’s Unfinished Revolution: The Role of the Media Revisited,
International Journal of Communication, 8, pp. 890–915.
33   S. Slyomovics (2005) The Performance of Human Rights in Morocco (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press).
Figure 2. Left: Protester literally wearing political figures, including Saida Menebhi (Rabat, April 
2014). Right: Book exchange after Felsafa fe Zenqa meeting (Tangier, December 2013).
Digital technologies reconstitute how politics are remembered. The tansiqiyat [local net- 
works] of 20Feb both facilitated and inspired a new ‘citizen media’ that relied heavily on 
digital tools and spaces. In addition to the traditional vernacular of, for instance, chanting 
and street performance, the readily-accessible digital technology, especially of recording 
and editing, enriched and renewed the possibilities for mobilization. This meant that through 
hyperlinks and hashtags, users were able easily to find sources and, also to rediscover them 
later. This gave birth to a different regime of memory-making. The rediscovery of the past 
was not about creating performative or artistic collages, although sometimes they had incred- 
ible artistic value, or even about the necessity to archive for legal purposes, as we find in 
Syria.34 It is about how this history in the making helps people cope with lived experiences 
in dignified ways and preserves new solidarities for the next stage of struggle: To prolong 
the stamina, to postpone exhaustion. As stated in this special issue’s introduction, it is 
important to see how crisis prepares the ground for (additional) political action, for moments 
that activate and push new ideological formations.35 These opportunities are grabbed when 
the window of possibility is small, as many of the Moroccan activists know very well from 
previous experience, and from observing activism elsewhere. But don’t we risk producing a
34 E. De Angelis & Y. Badran (2016) Syria Untold and the Anxiety of Digital Memory. Paper presented at 
International Association for Media and Communication Research, 30 July, Leicester, UK. Also see S. Haugbolle 
(2016), Evidence, Justice, and Peace-Making in Syria, in: Syria Untold, 8 December. Available online at: http:// 
www.syriauntold.com/en/2016/12/evidence-justice-peace-making-syria/, accessed November 2016.
35 See S. Haugbolle & A. Bandak (2017) The Ends of Revolution: Rethinking Ideology and Time in the Arab 
Uprisings, the introductory article for this issue.
conceptual loop when taking the theories and practices of grassroots moments at face value? 
In order to grasp the historic continuations and overlapping objectives and political ideals, 
we have to take ourselves out of the present moment and study the ‘befores’ and ‘afters’ of 
ongoing political developments.
Moroccan activists do not only reclaim the past in the present in order to correct a his- 
torical wrongdoing on the representational level, they mobilize the past for the present in 
order to change the world they live in and through struggle automatically provide tools for 
the future. For instance through the iconography of famous celebrated martyrs from earlier 
eras and chanting the name of Ila al Amam revolutionary Saida Mnebhi, who died during 
the legendary prison hunger strikes of 1976. But also by literally carrying her picture on 
a dress (Figure 2), while they embody the notion of ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’, 
they do not only attend to the past for how its repressions and betrayals but also with love 
and admiration. In a sense, they actively construct a narrative based on past symbols so as 
to prefigure future memories. We can even assume that by resurrecting ephemeral events 
and commemorating particular actors they place themselves in this legacy. And they do 
this through (old) photos on banners and (new) YouTube video collages that have become 
indicative of digital political consumption.
Unsurprisingly, the role of ICT is crucial in these mnemonic processes. More than any 
other source, these newly available technologies complicate previous ways that past rebel- 
lions are consumed. To understand the roles of memories better, we not only have to decon- 
struct political repression, but also show how this momentary vacuum creates (and stores) 
the collective memory of the movement. They are like mental reservoirs, which in due 
course, through new regimes of memory-making, allow a different source of and energy 
for activism. Feb20 involved instances of rebellion that were captured through spectacular 
images that are hard to remove or cover-up.
Memories of the Past for the Present to the Future
Memory studies have become a vital approach for anthropologists working on political 
change and conflicts.36 Questions around the need to revisit certain historic events—on the 
impact of reminiscing the past—are not unique to anthropology. As far back as Plato, memory 
has fascinated scholars, and beginning in the nineteenth century, the ground-breaking work 
of psychologists (e.g., Hermann Ebbinghaus, Sigmund Freud, Maurice Halbwach) turned 
memory and memory-making into a crucial field of research. Many clues are offered for mak- 
ing sense of the world in which we live and understanding the difference between memory 
from specific cases (thus remembered as it occurred in a particular context), referred to as 
episodic memory, to the general information (generic) knowledge, referred to as semantic 
memory.37 Yet, when zooming out from this scholarship, what can be considered episodic 
or semantic is less clear. In other words, what is remembered or forgotten is very context- 
dependent. Something merely semantic in one context can be episodic in another. In other 
words, when something is particularly affective in the past (episodic experiences), it can 
change our conception later, and in due course evolve into semantic (everyday) memories 
due to normalization through language, education, or behaviour.
Digital technologies have changed social and everyday dynamics. It could be said that an 
over-reliance on the internet has increased the tendency to forget, has induced short-term
36  See e.g., D. C. Berliner (2005) The Abuses of Memory: Reflections on the Memory Boom in Anthropology,
Anthropological Quarterly, 78(1), pp. 197–211.
37 J. Foster (2009) Memory. A Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
memories. In fact, scholarship about memory with regard to digital communication entails 
considerably different approaches. There are concerns that these technologies negatively 
affect our cognitive abilities and reduce our attention span. People have become more induced 
to short-term sources, they are less able to pause, reflect and therefore also less inclined to 
incorporate information into long-term memory.38 In that case, maybe the fast pace of digital 
media does indeed weaken abilities to remember (consolidate politics) in the organizational 
sense. For instance, YouTube videos rarely demand more than a few minutes’ attention, and 
on Twitter ‘discourse’ is reduced to a mere 140 characters. The tendency for constant digital 
archiving also raises questions about privacy and intimacy. Not only is content expanding 
into massive amounts of information, the focus has shifted to the individual, the self, and 
the constant preservation and presentation on digital media has become instant self-expres- 
sion.39 But it is clear that in the current context, simply being forgotten has become nearly 
impossible, and therefore considered not so much a right as it was formulated 15 years ago 
during debates about the digital divide, but in fact a virtue.40 These are all important ques- 
tions, but as others have argued, this particular fixation with memory is itself linked to the 
long-existing fear about amnesia and the bad effect of technology.41
An approach invested in critically studying Moroccan activism therefore needs insights 
from intersecting explorations. A number of fascinating studies about digital technologies 
have indeed become the venue and vehicle for memory studies.42 It has been argued that the 
main impact of narratives from the past on today’s remembrance occurs through the emphasis 
on archiving through digital media. Nostalgia and melancholia are often related matters in 
these discussions. Incidentally, there is no shortage of nostalgia in Morocco.
Morocco is drenched in memories and especially a certain type of public-retro nostalgia. 
On the one hand, there is the well-known externally projected fascination by (and later, for) 
the presence of international literati, such as the author Paul Bowles, in Tangier. On the other 
hand, there is a certain melancholia-infused recollection of colonial times through photogra- 
phy.43 Some previously unfamiliar memories, especially those contested by the state and out 
of public view for so long that most were obliterated from Moroccans’ collective (‘episodic’) 
memories, may come to problematize a romantic nostalgia, such as turning the sweet taste 
of 1960s hippies into a bitter one when it concerns epic moments, whether anti-colonial or 
domestic events (Figures 3 and 4). Despite the fact that struggles in the past have been kept
38 N. Carr (2010) The Shallows. What the Internet is Doing to our Brains (New York City: Atlantic Books).
39 G. Gudmundsdottir (2017) Forgetting Online: Self Representation on Social Network Sites. (London: Palgrave).
40 V. Mayer-Schönberger (2011) Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press).
41 E. Haskins (2007) Between Archive and Participation: Public Memory in a Digital Age, Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly, 37(4), pp. 401–422.
42 A. Hajek, C. Lohmeier & C. Pentzold (2016); C. Pentzold & C. Lohmeier (2014) Digital Media – Social Memory. 
Special Section of Media, Culture & Society, 36(6), pp. 745–809; A. Reading (2014) Mediated Mobilities, Media, 
Culture & Society, 36(3) pp. 285–301; E. Haskins (2007); and J. Garde-Hansen, A. Hoskins & A. Reading (eds) 
(2009) Save As … Digital Memories (London: Palgrave Macmillan).
43 Examples are available on, for instance, the following websites: Morocco Nostalgia at: https://www.pinterest. 
com/BMEDESIGN/morocco-nostalgia/; Old and Vintage Morocco at: https://nl.pinterest.com/Nissurin/old-and- 
vintage-morocco/; and Past to Present: Photos from Morocco at: http://www.past-to-present.com/showcountry. 
cfm?country=Morocco; date of access for all three foregoing websites was November 2016. I also came across 
a large dose of nostalgia among Israeli Jews of Moroccan origin who are lamenting the idyllic past of co-exist- 
ence censored by official Zionist narratives; see, for instance, the essay Shared Memories and Oblivion about 
Israeli Jews’ Nostalgia, by E. Trevisan. Available online at: http://www.quest-cdecjournal.it/focus.php?id=312, 
accessed November 2016.
Figure 3. Women of the resistance in Rabat 1950s.
Figure 4. Casablanca uprising of 1965.
hidden, contested, haunting and brutalized history tends to be resilient. Such histories are not 
completely forgotten even if not consciously remembered. This echoes Fredric Jameson’s 
critique of (postmodern) mass-mediation, which he describes as ‘nostalgia for the present’, 
a conceptual rejection of history through an emphasis on spectacle and commercialism.44 
Instead of critical inquiry, such media theories valorize consumption and particularly focus 
on the ‘new.’A correction to this postmodern condition is made possible both by the political 
moment of revolution and new forms of mediation, which allow for a critical unearthing of 
hidden histories in new contexts.
Web archives with digitized photo collections, for instance, open a window to scenes of 
which people never may have heard, or did but find hard to visualize. Archives of digitized 
photos are numerous and very diverse, from intercommunal and queer lifestyles, to epic 
moments of colonial violence and anti-colonial resistance. They include pictures, for exam- 
ple, of red-light districts and of Oum Kulthum dancing with people in the street during a 
visit to Morocco.45 Some of the resurfaced images complicate the official narrative that the 
anti-colonial struggle was lead and won by King Mohamed V, as they show how it rather 
resembled a struggle of a broad-based, grassroots, and nationwide movement. In this regard, 
the 1958–59 Rif uprisings are a case in point. It left many scars in northern Morocco.46 
Screenshots of the cover of the critical journal TelQuel showing Crown Prince Hassan II 
taking part in the armed repression of the insurrection, films like Brise du Silence (2015), 
now accessible via video platforms such as YouTube and Vimeo, as well as digitally-designed 
posters disseminated via Facebook groups, contribute to breaking the spell (see collage in 
Figure 5). Such digitally-triggered political reminiscence helps to contextualize and reorders 
popular interpretations of the historic lineage and therefore feels so revolutionary.
Revolutions create ruptures that, sometimes violently, shake normative experiences of 
chronology, whereby the one-dimensional continuous and linear timeframes become mul- 
ti-dimensional. They usher liminal moments through the collapse of past, present and future. 
For example, a number of my informants found out that their own mass revolts are not the 
first in the country, as they saw through new publications, or by meeting older activists 
at protests. As 19-year-old Amina remarked during an interview in Tangier in 2013, ‘we 
thought we were making history, but actually we are only now learning about history.’47 She 
was involved in the high-school and university protests, and through the solidarity of other 
leftist organizations whose activists had been students in the 1980s and even 1990s, these 
historical layers gradually were being revealed.
It turns out there were similarly important episodes in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s: major 
protests that challenged the status quo. They not only occurred in the country’s central 
nodes like Casablanca or Rabat, but also in the Rif and Tangier. New memories based on 
present struggles are produced, and reset as part of previously forgotten ones. These most 
probably will provide inspiration for new activities or simply reignite political stamina 
during downturns (most notably the sudden announcement of a national referendum or the
44 F. Jameson (1991) Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press).
45 See previous note; and also https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2015/12/174080/moroccos-most-emblemat- 
ic-historical-events-in-pictures/foradditionalexamples, accessed November 2016.
46 As Nabil Mouline’s excellent piece illustrates, the rebirth of the Rif Revolt continues; see: http://www.jadaliyya. 
com/pages/index/20664/reconsidering-the-rif-revolt-(1958-59), date of access November 2016.
47 Author Interview, Amina, Tangier, Morocco, 2013.
Figure 5. Top left: Crown Prince Hassan II participating in the massacres of 1958. Right: digital 
poster of the ground-breaking film about the Rif revolt, below left: scene from the film on YouTube.
legislative elections in 2011, but also the crackdowns in April 2014). In this reading, internet 
technologies have become mnemonic tools in similar ways that intense emotions activate 
reflexes. The experience of collective resilience is intense, bringing to mind other metaphors 
from memory studies, such as ‘Fight, Flight, Fright’ impulses.48
The way activists dress up or chant resembles such mnemonic reflexes. When I encoun- 
tered the screams or ululations in response to riot-police charges, or as I heard (and tried 
to repeat) the chants during fieldwork in Morocco, I began to recognize them as rituals. 
But they denote rituals that are both repetitions of and warnings from the past at the same 
time. Such rites expressed in the public sphere are a form of protest helped by activating 
memories. With reference to the earlier-mentioned Saida Mnebhi, protestors chanted ‘Saida 
irtah irtah sa nowasilo kifah’ [Saida, you just rest, we shall deliver your struggle], and about 
those imprisoned and killed in 2011–2014 crowds said together ‘‘taqalhom ‘damahom, 
wlad al-Sha’b ikhelfuhum’ [they arrested them, they tortured them, but the children of the 
people will replace them]. As Khlef means to replace, the activists identify as replacements 
of previous revolutionary subjects, and so embody the link between past and present. Heard
48 J. Foster (2009) Memory. A Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 6.
at street protests, these sayings show that activists are indebted to a wide source of political 
legacies, partly for melancholic reasons, but that nevertheless help make sense of the present. 
Moreover, I realized that most of those who were intensely engaged in activism have little 
patience—literally no time—for a kind of often-mentioned passive nostalgia. Thus, when it 
doesn’t actively restore a blacked-out past, it’s considered leisure, bourgeois: pontificating. 
Some even expressed that dwelling on the past takes away energy from the future. At first 
I believed this was a generational tension: a reaction from young about older leftists who 
sometimes reminiscence the valiant past. With more examination, I found that it was not 
related to younger comrades being annoyed by the older cadres at all. Plentiful interlocutors, 
from across generations and progressive tendencies, reflected on the past in different ways. 
The discussions and sometimes the deep reflections hinted at a conceptual difference 
between firstly, nostalgia as a passive, and often hierarchic, tool employing a moralistic 
melancholia of ‘when the left was really true to its revolutionary principles’ or ‘when we did 
it differently,’ and secondly a very different kind of nostalgia, that of a pro-active preparation 
which, while it feeds off antecedent passions, it reaches out for the new and the unknown. 
For example, I came to know Jamal in 2013, and we met a number of times between 2013 
and 2015 and through him I interviewed numerous other activists who were involved in the 
1970s and 1980s. Jamal himself, in his 50s and active in Rabat with AMDH (Morocco’s 
foremost and independent human rights association), and in the trade union movement, was 
not interested in the ‘heroic’ past of the left nor of the radical fight against the regime of
Hassan II. He saw that as passive nostalgia, akin to the first form:
Look, I have a project for the future more than nostalgia to the past. Only dogma- 
tists have this nostalgia for the past. I have a project and I know that I will not see it 
achieved in my life or even for the coming generation, but this project will come true 
in the future. ... I did not start this project but will continue in it. Therefore, it is not 
the nostalgia that motivates me, but my future project.49
But if the 2011 events now are rendered ‘the past,’ scale and intensity changes the quantifying 
measures, what is ‘the past’? This instant past-making echo the truism popularly attributed 
to Lenin: ‘There are decades where nothing happens, then there are weeks when decades 
happen.’50 Revolutions alter the perception of time, and 2011 is now ‘zaman, liyaam’ (‘the 
time of yesterday’) the times of mass rebellions. Even the short period between 2011 and 
2012, a fraction of time yet full of change, has become a historic episode for which some 
have become nostalgic. Perhaps in that case most experiences, as described so appealingly, 
‘apart from the thin edge of the present’ are already a form of memory.51
This brings me to another observation. As long as it is connected to a future project, activ- 
ists will not be neutral in their motives or objective in their choices., Tactical manoeuvres 
against manipulations of the earlier-mentioned divide-and-rule strategy of the makhzan 
always are required. Hence, their experiences are encoded, decoded and mediated in very 
selective ways. For instance, their online disseminated content tends to display the visual 
and audio markers that conjure strength. Their tone and message responds to everyday 
tactics of survival against co-optation and repression, and, because of the common leftist
49 Author Interview, Rabat, December 2013.
50 See the archived quotes at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/quotes.htm, accessed November 2016.
51 Gazzaniga, cited in J. Foster (2009) Memory, p. 2.
challenge, to overcome internal divisions. This is of course not typical Moroccan but an 
idiosyncratic strategy of progressive activists. Mehdi, who is in his early 60s, has many 
personal memories to share from his time in the revolutionary Marxist movement Ila al- 
Amam—to which many of the well-known leftist revolutionaries such as Abraham Serfati 
belonged—which was underground until the late 1990s, after which it renamed itself Nahj 
al-Demoqrati [The Democratic way] and began to operate publicly. While Jamal cautioned 
about the past, he was not keen on idealizing the present either. He explained that sometimes 
forgetting is good because not remembering also can be empowering. During a meeting 
in Tangier he commented that it’s not always fun to remember some of the comrades who 
went over to the makhzan:
There were big shifts in 1990s. Nahj al-Demoqrati continued from Ilal al-Amam after 
years of underground organising. The 2011 protests in the Arab world and Morocco 
didn’t come out of the blue. I mean our demands didn’t really change. They did 
become louder. I remember we mentioned karama [dignity] and corruption at the time 
(1970s/1980s] as well. This is our collective inheritance [hadi athar diyalna], and the 
legacy of 20Feb movement.52
Mehdi clearly wanted to convey an idea about not idealizing the past. He made me under- 
stand that the act of forgetting sometimes is needed to construct new ethics, to make space 
for self-growth, and to allow different identities and innovative cultural definitions to merge 
with existing (revolutionary) frameworks. This process, or openness, can be blocked by 
frameworks that were stymied for a long time when the movement was inactive. In this way, 
forgetting also can be an empowering form: a useful amnesia. The 20Feb experience is part 
of the leftist athar (legacy, inheritance), as Mehdi says. Thus, activists often add new layers 
along the road, they are not writing onto a tabula rasa. This athar of the radical left was 
retained through a number of human rights, feminist, and legal associations in the dangerous 
1980s. The radical left represents different generations and has a popular base, and their 
formulations should not be understood as the vanguard or vanquished, as it is framed in the 
introduction of this special issue, but as both. Sometimes the vanquished return to central 
stage and the vanguard is exposed as a fraud.
One of the most powerful chants (this article title) I heard during fieldwork in Tangier, 
2013, and later during a protest outside the prison of Casablanca where activists were held 
was ‘l-Makhzan al-’akbari bgha iraja’na, li-lawry, li l-ayaam rasas awtani, wa ‘ahd Hassan 
Tani’ (the reactionary state wants to take us back, to the years of lead again and to the era 
of Hassan II). This reference is not about the need to remember solitary suffering, but to 
contextualize the power relations that still dominate them: that the makhzan won’t hesitate, 
but if it needs to, it will use the kind of fierce repression it did in the ‘years of lead’ that the 
people have been told is part of the dark past; their freedom is built on false promises.53 
The commemorative practices communicate that history cannot repeat itself. Through such 
chanting, bystanders were re-sensitized to the past, and sometimes these bystanders would 
be filming the scene so as to show to their friends or families later, showing the overlap 
between offline and online politics. Furthermore, by reminiscing through the various digital
52 Author Interview with Mehdi, Tangier, March 2014.
53 And it really did so during several cases of imprisonment, torture, and killings. Those incidents are censored 
out of mainstream media but salvaged as the theme of chants during protests. In that way remembering and 
retelling is a continuation of existing traditions of oral history.
forms that they can use, activists also remind themselves of the rules of the game. These 
rules are also relevant for their engagement on the ground, despite the online repression they 
may face with hacking or surveillance, it matters in the offline domain.
Online/Offline Remediation
The need to organize, to maintain the energy of the movement and to deepen political 
consciousness, and simply to salvage what remains, is very time-consuming. Even worse, 
the extra energy produced by the adrenaline that comes from successful developments can 
be lacking. This is where the online memories constructed before and mentioned above, 
become valuable. It shows that archiving present (new) memories is in fact an investment, 
to relish and consume again later. This double-layered mnemonics is a direct consequence 
of the revolutionary moment. Those making and witnessing the revolution in the present 
document these new alternatives. But not without also being framed by previous experiences, 
the reappropriation of the past moments is part of this script. Thus the rediscovered fuels 
for the movement’s activists, the energy and stamina being stored for later, are found in the 
past. As the historic experiences of mass struggle are re-inscribed in everyday life, debates 
about how they will be remembered continue across time.
Hence, as the critique by many activists about state-orchestrated reconciliation projects 
suggested to me, it is also a matter of reparation in the cognitive sense because parts of the 
country’s history are not given due attention. They are remembering in order to repair the 
‘years of lead.’ It seems to come down to the very basic adage that without justice there can 
be no peace. If today’s activist sees herself as part of a revolutionary athar, then her own 
present involvement has a place in memory-making for those after her. The aim of these 
memories goes beyond retelling what people experienced; it is a retelling in order to continue 
the struggle where it left off. They don’t want to reconcile as part of the government’s aims 
to move on because they discover there never was a peaceful reconciliation. Interesting par- 
allels are found during the M15 (Indignados) protests in Spain where people simultaneously 
respond to a Black Hole: a post-Franco, neoliberal consensus.54 Spanish activists share with 
their comrades in Morocco a rejection of the very ontology of this ‘new’ chapter, or fresh 
‘start.’55 One of the first tasks of a new ruler or after regime-change is to get the masses into 
a new stable normality, complete with a political-cultural cleansing operation. The modern 
consumer as the ideal subject represents the re-start. But the activists do the reverse.
The fact that they stand on the shoulders of their predecessors and proudly situate them- 
selves as part of a regional history of a leftist realm suggests that the present recollections 
also began to merge with another reparation: the black hole of Arab progressive radical- 
ism. Some Moroccan interviewees would reference national and regional heroes such as 
Abraham Serfaty, Mehdi Amel and Mehdi Ben Barka in the same breath and conceive 
of them as ‘theirs’: Part of an Arab left identity despite the repression of democratic-left 
movements that actually have a long history.56 These activists want to live and protect their 
way of life based on justice, and a fair separation of the powers, and of course an honest 
divide of the (massive) profits of capitalism. Albeit very neglected in Morocco, they are
54 A. Ribeiro de Menezes (forthcoming) Entanglements of Memory and Crisis in Contemporary Spain, Bulletin 
of Hispanic Studies.
55 Spain has a rich legacy of anti-fascist resistance that is well preserved and documented (the international bri- 
gades being particularly inspiring) through books and films about the battles of Catalunya; it is thus part of a 
transnational leftist narrative.
56 S. Haugbolle & M. Sing (2016) New Approaches to Arab Left Histories, Arab Studies Journal, 24(1), pp. 90–97.
taken to be, and self-identify as, the offspring of this radical left legacy. This is closely 
related to what Philip Marfleet remarked about political subjectivities emerging from the 
Arab uprisings57: By erupting in revolutionary protests, their demands embolden us to defy 
the analytical givens.
These revolutionary episodes provide examples that remind people of previous victories, 
and such ‘reminiscence bumps’ are remarkably resistant to forgetting and carry emotional 
resonance.58 Ideas about a (momentary) ‘suspended environment’ help understand this con- 
text of revolutionary uprisings that can be described as an emotional resonance that con- 
veys a zero-social-gravity. They concern deeply affective memories related to personally 
empowering and uplifting experiences of solidarity, of a sense of genuine equality and about 
which activists talked during interviews and, pointing at their arm, comment ‘look, it still 
gives me Goosebumps’; it is about freedom and comradeship without social, religious and 
class differences between activists.59 This is also the intersectional angle where the macro 
politics of major events are shaped by the micro politics of emotions, as Wendy Pearlman 
describes.60 Many activists express the intention to live the future now. There is no necessity 
to postpone the ideal forms of organizing or the progressive (social) lifestyles, and they reject 
the idea of ‘after the revolution,’ because, for them, being a revolutionary means daring to 
practice what you preach in the present.
While memory or mediation is often about the digital realm, the offl realm imposes 
itself on the digital. The dual online and offl reality are in turn conditioned by the 
emergence of physical sites of remembrance. The places where activists meet or return to 
for sit-ins. In Tangier, the small square in Bni Makada became such a mnemonic place. 
Activists gather there for dhikra’s [commemorations] of the original 2011 uprising. In 
these physical places memories are maintained and such offl sites of remembrance 
simultaneously become the opportunity to protest something else. Thus, they themselves 
become the utility, the mnemonic mediator. One of the 20Feb commemoration-protests 
I attended ended in numerous slogans about the privatization of water and increasing 
electricity prices by the French-owned corporation Amendis. It was prophetic because a 
year later the broadly shared anger at the Amendis price rises had mobilized thousands 
into the streets of Tangier, inspiring numerous comparisons with the epic protests in 
2011. In this way, protest sites both recall the past and generate activity in the present; 
activities that are experienced offline and recorded or shared online, to be recollected 
again in the future.
Conclusion
The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be 
born, in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.61
… To attend carefully to something we are leaving, as survival, something our gut 
tells us we ought to cherish and preserve, and bring with us on our inexorable March 
into the unknown.62
57 P. Marfleet (2016) The political subject in the ‘Arab Spring,’ Contemporary Levant, 1(1), pp. 4–11.
58 J. Foster (2009) Memory, p. 64.
59 I thank Ghassan Hage for making this fascinating point during a workshop session, and I thank Sune Haugbolle 
for inviting me to this conference.
60 W. Pearlman (2013) Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings, Perspectives on Politics, 11(2) 
June, pp. 387–409.
61 A. Gramsci (1971) The Prison Notebooks, p. 276.
If one observation during fieldwork and attending numerous protests and meetings can be 
made, it is that repetition has become a strategy for preserving the present, for keeping the 
ongoing struggles and emotions related to their enduring initiatives. This chapter reminds us 
of grassroots activists and their extremely hard work when forced to avoid multiple forms of 
subjugations and simultaneously having to change those conditions. The first few months of 
2011 were rather incredible. Peoples’ growing confidence was a serious warning; they man- 
aged to push their demands with successful mobilization across the country. The Moroccan 
regime was probably on the verge of collapse, which explains the drastic measures it took 
quite early on. The outcome of the historic King’s Speech in March 2011 in response to 
mass protests was devastating for the movement. The unrelenting political dominance in the 
Moroccan context is first a result of the unequal balance of forces. But the movement had 
(temporarily) defied the regime and caused an important shift in the political algorithms: it 
challenged the balance of forces by adding another into the usual equation (money, arms, 
law); the category of al-Sha’b, the people. That, if nothing else, was the essence of the 
revolutionary moment in Morocco.
Over the past five years, since beginning my research until writing this article, the neo- 
liberal modes of suppression continue and judiciary harassment of and by the media that 
were mentioned by the activists and discussed in this article even increased. And yet they 
have not stopped critics. In fact, another great wave of protests erupted after the death of 
Mohsin Fikri in the coastal town of al-Hoceima in October 2016 as Morocco collectively 
rose up and hundreds of thousands of people protested in over 40 cities. It was in response 
to the brutal crushing of a fish seller but cannot be understood outside of their larger politi- 
cal-economic context. The protests reminded of the recurring anger about police repression 
in continuation of the protest in 2011 as well as grievances of the imazighen in the northern 
and southern parts who still carry the weight of an ‘unfinished business’ that has to do also 
with the repression of the 1958 rebellion discussed in this article.63
Despite the highly performative moments that were generated by government-funded 
reconciliation exercises in the 1990s, there has remained a sense of limbo. I argue that pre- 
cisely because they were banned then, they are more likely to be expressed now. As I have 
shown, past events have become the belated sources: martyrs from the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s and recently are merged in collages and chants. For the makhzan, the efficacy of their 
memory must be obscured or encrypted with a contradicting explanation. It is overridden so 
as not to allow the reminiscing of such memories to produce a didactic impact. The past has 
not really been dealt with, just passed with time, like the adage of Gramsci, the old is being 
rejected, dying in terms of its legitimacy and support yet the new cannot be born. People 
become aware of this during periods of heightened protest or counter-revolution. How to 
disrupt the political norms without getting stuck in a loop caused by this political oblivion, 
is probably the most difficult task. Meanwhile, activists are aware of the risk to idealize the 
past let alone the present and therefore see the need to differentiate between an optimism
62  D. Crawford, B. Deseyn & A. Bamouh (2014) Nostalgia for the Present: Ethnography and Photography in 
Berber (Leiden, NL: Leiden University Press), p. xi.
63  M. Aouragh (2016) Fishy Neoliberalism in Morocco, November 10, 2016, Historical Materialism. Available 
at: http://www.historicalmaterialism.org/node/236, accessed November 2016.
geared toward garnering a stronger will and motivation, and allowing space for pessimism 
about their capacities and conditions.
Rituals are needed (especially through repetition) because they help break ruling-class 
hegemony, a mystical dynastic hegemony acquired over many centuries and maintained 
through a combination of Sharifian populism and dictatorial fear. This two-edged instrument 
hangs like a Damocles’ sword over would-be activists and demobilizes many of their revolu- 
tionary potentials. These rulers constantly are challenged by counter-hegemonic narratives, 
which are not necessarily synchronous with the personal choices and styles of activists but 
nurtured by historic loyalties, the approach of a political party, or the specific inspirations 
of ideological frameworks. Sometimes alliances are weak, unable to garner trust or build 
cooperation. That is why the quintessential activist task has become to document and portray 
the demands, the protests, the events and to remediate them as a united spectacle. Activists 
don’t want the makhzan to exploit the internal differences. They have to be selective about 
the narratives they produce. Therefore the memories they revive from the past, and are 
themselves making in the present for the future, must be selective. They show that emotion, 
inspiration and stamina are part of the general survival mechanisms. That means that both 
material and immaterial objectives are required, they form a set of collective emotions 
that become instrumental for social justice. Material and physical and urgent resistance is 
joined by a sentimental longing for something better, at times assumed with the past but 
also anticipated in the future.
I consider the continuation of the past in the present as a means to reproduce the activists’ 
experiences and stamina. Recreating certain exhilarating moments helps to generate multiple 
cycles of resistance instead of ‘ending’ with one. My reading of contemporary online/offline 
memory-making echoes David Crawford’s above-quoted notion of nostalgia: a longing in the 
present that is often about the future, which is beautifully described as ‘something our gut 
tells us we ought to cherish and preserve.’ This goes well in conjunction with theorization 
of Nostalgia of the Present as formulated by Fredric Jameson.64 By bringing Crawford and 
Jameson together we learn to see the Moroccan context as marked by inequality, which 
allows for an anti-capitalist vocabulary to understand the aims of the activists in times of 
revolution. This article illustrates how eventually online/offline dialectics entail different 
temporalities of present-future, but also that their ongoing memories-in-making are linked 
to the structural inequalities of technology. This means that the struggle over memory is at 
the heart of the struggle for justice.
In the past six years we have seen that it is attractive to give up on the activist, and the 
Arab Winter was declared as quickly as the Arab Spring. People seem eager to declare the 
revolutionary project as ‘failed.’ Numerous interlocutors complained that they only felt loved 
when they produced spectacles, but were ignored after the first setback. Yet, they return to our 
screens with another round of struggles, as ‘new horizons of possibilities keep emerging.’65 
The revolutionary moments carry the agents, objects and circumstances not so much in a 
state of liminality but along a ruptured (though repetitive) continuum.
64 See website sources in Footnote 43.
65  See the introductory article to this special issue by S. Haugbolle & A. Bandak, The Ends of Revolution: 
Rethinking Ideology and Time in the Arab Uprisings.
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